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THE RIGHT OF SURVIVORSHIP AS IT RELATES
TO PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY IN MONTANA
Douglas Stevenson
I. INTRODUCTION
In fashioning a body of law suited to governing partnerships,
the common law courts combined elements of tenancy in common
and joint tenancy to create a new form of property ownership.1
This new common law form of ownership differed from joint ten-
ancy in that it did not include the right of survivorship 2 character-
istic of joint tenancy. 3 As partnership law developed in the courts,
inconsistencies and insufficiencies in the law also developed, lead-
ing to a need for legislation.4
The Commissioners on Uniform State Laws completed origi-
nal drafting of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) in 1914." Since
then a majority of jurisdictions have enacted the UPA.8 In 1947
Montana joined this majority by enacting the Montana Uniform
Partnership Act (Montana UPA). 7 The Montana UPA has re-
mained relatively unchanged since its original adoption.8 The UPA
and the Montana UPA contain the stated purpose of establishing
uniformity in partnership law among the states enacting the UPA. 9
The drafters of the UPA included the new form of ownership
that evolved under the common law,10 and labelled that new form
"tenancy in partnership."' 1 Similar to the common law form, ten-
ancy in partnership includes no right of survivorship.12 However,
1. J. CRANE & A. BROMBERG, CRANE AND BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 40(a) at 228-29
(1968).
2. Id. § 40(a) at 228.
3. "The essential characteristic of a joint tenancy is the right of survivorship."
Casagranda v. Donahue, 178 Mont. 479, 483, 585 P.2d 1286, 1288 (1978).
4. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 40(a), at 228-29.
5. Id. § 2, at 13.
6. UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § - , 6 U.L.A. 1 (Supp. I 1987). The updated table on
page 1 of the Pocket Part shows that every state except Louisiana has enacted the provi-
sions of the UPA. The District of Columbia, Guam, and the Virgin Islands have also enacted
the UPA.
7. The Montana UPA can be found at MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 35-10-101 to -615 (1987).
8. Only four sections of the Montana UPA have been amended since its adoption.
9. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-104(4) (1987), provides: "This chapter shall be so inter-
preted and construed as to effect its general purpose to make uniform the law of those
states which enact it." UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 4(4), 6 U.L.A. 16 (1914).
10. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 40 (b), at 230.
11. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-502(1) (1987).
12. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-102 (2)(d) (1987) states in part that: "the last surviving
partner has no right to possess the partnership property for any but a partnership purpose."
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this did not completely eliminate the right of survivorship in a
partnership setting. According to the Montana UPA, partners hold
property acquired with partnership funds as tenants in partner-
ship, "unless the contrary intention appears." 3
In re Estate of Palmer14 presented the Montana Supreme
Court with the question of what constitutes sufficient evidence of a
"contrary intention" by the parties to hold property as joint te-
nants, rather than as tenants in partnership. Deciding the case
without setting down a clear standard for Montana practitioners to
follow, the Montana Supreme Court essentially left open this ques-
tion. This note suggests a possible framework for Montana lawyers
handling a similar case.
II. THE FACTS
William and Robert Palmer were brothers who owned and op-
erated a cattle ranch. In 1947 they opened a checking account to-
gether, signing a signature card stating the account was joint ten-
ancy property.15 The brothers used only this checking account in
conjunction with their ranch business.16
Commencing in 1949 and continuing until Robert's death the
Palmers operated their ranch as a partnership named "Palmer
Brothers. 17 William married and had a son, Brad Palmer, who
also participated in the ranch operation.18 William and Robert
added Brad's name to the checking account used by the partner-
ship.19 They made no other change in the signature card for the
checking account at that time.20
The Palmers branded the cattle on their ranch with two
brands.21 The brothers originally registered the first brand to Wil-
13. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-203(2) (1987) provides: "Unless the contrary intention
appears, property acquired with partnership funds is partnership property." MONT. CODE
ANN. § 35-10-502(1) (1987) provides: "A partner is co-owner with the other partners of spe-
cific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership."
14. __ Mont. - , 708 P.2d 242 (1985).
15. Id. at _, 708 P.2d at 248.
16. Id.
17. Id. at , 708 P.2d at 243. There was no written partnership agreement between
the brothers. However, Montana law does not require a written agreement to form a part-
nership. See, e.g., Truck Ins. Exch. v. Industrial Indem. Co., - Mont. __, 688 P.2d
1243 (1984); Walsh v. Ellingson Agency, 188 Mont. 367, 372, 613 P.2d 1381, 1384 (1980).
18. Appellant's Brief at 22 (available in the State Law Library in Helena); Palmer,
- Mont. __, 708 P.2d at 242.
19. Palmer at __, 708 P.2d at 248.
20. Appellant's Brief at 9; Palmer, - Mont. ., 708 P.2d 242.
21. Palmer, Mont. at -, 708 P.2d at 249. Under Montana law therv is a pre-
sumption of ownership of cattle by the owner of the brand they have been marked with.
MONT. CODE ANN. § 81-3-105 (1987) in part provides: "the certificate [recording ownership of
[Vol. 49
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liam and Robert 2 2 In 1971 they re-registered that brand, changing
the ownership to William or Robert.23 The second brand was origi-
nally registered to William or Robert.24
In 1979, William opened a brokerage account with Merrill
Lynch.2 5 William used funds from the partnership checking ac-
count to establish this brokerage account.26 The brokerage firm
records disclosed the account as belonging solely to William.
However, Robert signed an "Authorization to Transfer Customer's
Segregated Funds" as a joint tenant, thus giving control over the
funds in the brokerage account to Robert as well as William.2 8
The partnership also utilized other assets, most notably real
property. 29 Title to the real property was held by William and
Robert as tenants in common. 0
Robert married Constance in 1979.1 He died two years later,
leaving Constance as his sole heir.2 As personal representative of
Robert's estate, Constance petitioned the court for division of the
real property.3 3 The trial court ordered the property sold and the
proceeds divided.34 This decision was affirmed by the Montana Su-
preme Court in Palmer v. Palmer.35 As a result, Constance re-
ceived one half of the value of the real property.36
During the probate of Robert's estate, Constance maintained
that William and Robert owned the checking account, brokerage
account, brands and cattle as tenants in partnership and therefore
ownership of Robert's share should pass to her by inheritance.37
a brand] is also prima facie evidence that the person, firm, or corporation entitled to use the
mark or brand is the owner of all animals on which it appears in the position and on the
species of animal stated in the certificate." This point is further discussed in Marshall v.
Minlschmidt, 148 Mont. 263, 270, 419 P.2d 486, 490 (1966): "A corollary to this statutory
rule, that prima facie, one is the owner of cattle bearing his recorded brand is that prima
facie the owners of the recorded brand have the same interest in the cattle bearing their
brand as is indicated by the brand record."
22. Palmer, - Mont. at -, 708 P.2d at 249.
23. Id.
24. Appellant's Brief at 4. On this point, by not differentiating between the registra-
tion of the two brands, the court stated the facts differently than presented by the parties.
25. Palmer, __ Mont. at - , 708 P.2d at 243.
26. Id. at -, 708 P.2d at 250.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Appellant's Brief at 19.
30. Id.
31. Palmer, Mont. at -, 708 P.2d at 243.
32. Id.
33. Palmer v. Palmer, 202 Mont. 182, 183, 657 P.2d 92, 92 (1983).
34. Id. at 183, 657 P.2d at 92.
35. Id. at 184, 657 P.2d at 93.
36. Appellant's Brief at 23; Palmer, __ Mont. __, 708 P.2d 242.
37. Palmer. - Mont. at _ . 708 P.2d at 243.
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William maintained that he and Robert owned the assets as joint
tenants and, therefore, ownership should pass to him by right of
survivorship. 8 The trial court held that William and Robert owned
all these assets as tenants in partnership. From this decision Wil-
liam appealed."
III. THE COURT'S TREATMENT
In Palmer, the Montana Supreme Court began by stating that
the provisions of the Montana UPA controlled the ownership of
the property.4 ° With little Montana case law to utilize in interpret-
ing the UPA, the court looked to the historical background of part-
nership law citing three treatises published in the nineteenth
century.4'
From these historical sources the court extracted the predomi-
nant common law rule prior to the twentieth century, that "legal
title alone could not control."4 The court then set out, without
discussion, various relevant provisions of the UPA.4" With this
background, the court considered the ownership of the items of
property in question: the checking account, brands, cattle and bro-
kerage account.44
As noted by the court, the Montana UPA provides that prop-
erty acquired with partnership funds is owned by tenancy in part-
nership unless a contrary intention is shown.45 William maintained
that the signature card of the checking account, stating the parties
were joint tenants, showed the necessary contrary intent.46 Con-
stance contended that the account consisted exclusively of partner-
ship funds and served as the only partnership checking account. 47
The court followed the common law rule that, in a partnership, the
form of ownership was disregarded.48 Applying that rule to inter-
pret the relevant Montana UPA provisions, the court found no suf-
ficient evidence of intent by the parties to hold the property other
than by tenancy in partnership.49
38. Id.
39. Id. at -, 708 P.2d at 244.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 708 P.2d at 244-46.
42. Id. at -, 708 P.2d at 246.
43. Id.
44. Id. at 708 P.2d at 247-50.
45. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-203(2) (1987).
46. Palmer, - Mont. at _, 708 P.2d at 248. See also, Appellant's Brief at 8.
47. Palmer, __ Mont. at ., 708 P.2d at 248.
48. Id. at - , 708 P.2d at 249.
49. Id.
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Still relying on the nineteenth century treatises to interpret
the Montana UPA, the court in turn addressed the question of
ownership of each of the remaining assets. Having decided that the
checking account was held by tenancy in partnership the court
concluded that the other assets were likewise held by tenancy in
partnership. 50 The court held that William had not produced any
credible evidence to show a contrary intention sufficient to over-
come the presumption of tenancy in partnership. 51
As a result of the court's decision Constance Palmer received
one-half of the checking account, cattle, and brokerage account of
Palmer Brothers. The dissent to Palmer suggests that "uncertainty
and doubt" concerning property ownership will also follow as a
further result of the decision.62
IV. ANALYSIS
The reasoning in Palmer is based largely upon the belief that
the UPA merely codifies the historical authority that preceded it.
The court relied on pre-UPA authority in making its determina-
tion,53 ignoring relevant post-UPA cases and treatises.54 While the
authors cited by the court had a major impact upon the formation
of the laws of partnership,55 it does not necessarily follow that
these older authorities can be used to properly interpret the UPA.
As stated by Professor Crane, a leading commentator on partner-
ship law:
The assertion [that the UPA merely codifies the common law] is
sometimes used as an excuse for ignoring the Act and invoking
inconsistent prior precedent. This is an old common law tech-
nique for undermining statutes and has little to recommend it. In
many respects, depending on a jurisdiction's version of the com-
mon law, the Act does merely codify. But in many others, particu-
larly those centering on property and creditors' rights, it makes
major changes. 6
The Montana UPA included these major changes, allowing
50. Id. at -, 708 P.2d at 250.
51. Id.
52. Id. at __, 708 P.2d at 251 (Turnage, C.J., dissenting).
53. See, e.g., Palmer, __ Mont. at - , 708 P.2d at 249.
54. Palmer, - Mont. at -, 708 P.2d at 252 (Morrison, J., dissenting). "At the
time that majority's treasured treatises were published, Blacks were chattels and women
could neither own nor convey real estate. I find it useful to examine some cases decided in
this century."
55. S. ROWLEY, ROWLEY ON PARTNERSHIP § 1.1, at 8 (1960). Rowley lists Story and Col-
lyer, both cited in Palmer, as having had a strong influence in shaping partnership law.
56. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 2 at 13.
1988]
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partners to hold partnership property other than by tenancy in
partnership when that intention appears. Following the common
law rule that disregards the form of ownership, the Palmer court
virtually eliminated any method of establishing such a contilary in-
tention.5 7 This reliance on outdated authority flawed the court's
reasoning. By looking to case law actually interpreting the UPA,58
the court may have reached a different result.59
For example, in Block v. Schmidt,60 the Michigan Supreme
Court addressed a case factually similar to Palmer."1 In Block, two
brothers engaged in a partnership farming operation that contin-
ued for a number of years. They held the partnership checking ac-
count in joint tenancy. In addition, they held title to the land as
joint tenants. The court in Block gave effect to the joint tenancies
of the checking account and the land, as they showed intentions
contrary to holding the property in partnership.2
Clearly, the intent of the partners is the central issue in deter-
mining the form of ownership under the UPA. Therefore, this
analysis will focus on the various means of establishing the part-
ners' intent: Agreements between the partners, source of funds,
record title, other evidence of intent, and fraud, mistake and
estoppel.
A. Agreements Between the Partners
The court in Palmer stated that assets are held by tenancy in
partnership if used in the partnership or acquired with partnership
funds.6 3 However, modern authority on partnership law generally
disagrees with that contention, giving more weight to agreements
57. Perhaps a different result would have been reached if the parties expressed their
intention of passing the assets by survivorship at the death of one partner in a written
partnership agreement. However, Montana law allows partnerships to be formed absent a
written agreement. See supra note 17. It would seem that the court should not discriminate
against parties who form partnerships by means other than a written agreement.
58. Unless otherwise indicated the cases herein were decided following the adoption of
the UPA by the state whose court decided the case.
59. Palmer, __ Mont. at - , 708 P.2d at 253 (Morrison, J., dissenting). "I have
been unable to find any American cases in the last 100 years that support the majority's
position here."
60. 296 Mich. 610, 296 N.W. 698 (1941).
61. Block is factually distinguishable from Palmer in that real property was also in-
volved. The Palmer court based its analysis upon rules relating to ownership of real prop-
erty by partnerships, and then reasoned that the same rules applied to personal property.
Palmer, - Mont. at - , 708 P.2d 246. Therefore Block is also helpful to demonstrate
that the provisions of the UPA discussed herein apply to real and personal property alike.
See also, Estate of Allen, 239 N.W.2d 163 (Iowa 1976).
62. 296 Mich. 610, 620, 296 N.W. 698, 702 (1941).
63. Palmer, - Mont. at - , 708 P.2d at 249.
202 [Vol. 49
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between the partners. As Professor Crane explains:
The partners can decide what shall and shall not be partnership
property. Their decision binds creditors and third persons unless
overridden by rules of estoppel or apparent ownership.. . . Often
there will be a specific written agreement that expresses their in-
tent beyond any reasonable doubt. . . . All too frequently, how-
ever, there is no such agreement, a dispute arises, and the prob-
lem must be settled by inferring their intent from their
behavior. . . . Thus, possession or use is not very significant be-
cause of the tendency to mix personal and partnership affairs, es-
pecially in family firms."
As Professor Crane suggests, the best evidence of intent is a
written agreement between the partners. The Florida Supreme
Court addressed such a situation in Hirsch v. Bartels. 5 In Hirsch a
written partnership agreement provided that at the death of one
partner the assets of the business would pass to the remaining
partners by survivorship. The court held that this agreement con-
stituted an expression of a contrary intention sufficient to defeat a
claim for a share of the assets by an heir of a deceased partner.6
The more difficult situation occurs, as in Palmer, where the
partners have no written partnership agreement, and one partner
has died. In Bailes v. Bailes the Arkansas Supreme Court ad-
dressed such a situation. 7 In that case, the court found an oral
partnership agreement concerning a dog food business. The Bailes
court determined that the assets in question, including checking
accounts used in the business, were partnership assets. The court
upheld the right of partners to make agreements allowing the de-
ceased partner's share of the partnership to pass by survivorship to
the surviving partners. 8 In addition, the court stated that the
agreement need not be in writing, if supported by sufficient evi-
dence of the partners' intent. 9 Included in the supporting evidence
in Bailes was the joint tenancy signature cards of the partnership
checking accounts.
The dissent to Palmer cited both Hirsch and Bailes as author-
ity for enforcing the survivorship rights of the joint tenants in
Palmer.70 While the majority in Palmer did not choose to follow
these cases, they remain available as valid authority for a similar
64. CRANE, supra note 1, § 37(a), at 203.
65. 49 So. 2d 531 (Fla. 1950).
66. Id. at 532.
67. 261 Ark. 389, 549 S.W.2d 69 (1977).
68. Id. at 396, 549 S.W.2d at 73.
69. Id. at 391-92, 549 S.W.2d at 71.
70. Palmer, - Mont. at - , 708 P.2d at 253 (Morrison, J., dissenting).
19881
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case.
B. Source of Funds
Relying on pre-UPA authority to determine ownership, the
court in Palmer looked solely to the source of funds used to ac-
quire the property. Under the UPA there exists a presumption of
ownership from the source of funds used to acquire the property."1
But this presumption from source of funds is not conclusive, and
courts have generally enforced the parties' contrary intent when it
is expressed. 2
In Cave v. Cave,73 the New Mexico Supreme Court held that
the partners could use partnership funds to purchase assets they
would own as joint tenants. The joint tenancy assets, Treasury
bonds in that case, could pass by survivorship. The court stated
that: "Even if the brothers were partners, they could purchase
property from partnership assets to be held in joint tenancy. We
have no trouble in concluding that these bonds were held in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship and became the sole property of
the survivor.''
74
So, while the general rule is that the source of funds used to
purchase an asset creates a presumption of the ownership of the
asset, a party may rebut that presumption. The presumption be-
comes more helpful, however, when the asset in question is not of a
type that has recorded ownership or title, and there is little other
evidence of intent.
C. Record Title
Certain types of property have a corresponding record of own-
ership. When the record suggests ownership other than by the
partnership, the intent expressed in the record creates a presump-
tion against ownership by tenancy in partnership. Professor Crane
states this presumption as follows:
If the property is a kind which has a record title (such as real
estate, motor vehicles or stock certificates) or is carried in a given
name (like a checking account or savings account), there is pre-
sumption of some vigor that the named owner is the beneficial
owner.
7 5
71. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-203(2) (1987).
72. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 37(c), at 208; ROWLEY, supra note 55, § 8.2, at
209.
73. 81 N.M. 797, 747 P.2d 480 (1970).
74. Id. at 803, 747 P.2d at 486.
75. CRANE & BROMBERG, supra note 1, § 37(d), at 209.
[Vol. 49
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The assets involved in Palmer were all of the type having re-
corded ownership. Interpreting the UPA through modern authority
would have allowed the presumption from source of funds to be
overcome by the intent expressed in the documents of ownership.
The dissent in Palmer76 offered Stroh v. Dumas77 as authority
for finding that the partners held the assets in question by joint
tenancy. Factually similar to Palmer, Stroh involved a partnership
engaged in buying and selling cattle. The partners held the part-
nership checking account as joint tenants. The court in Stroh held
that at the death of one partner the checking account passed to
the surviving joint tenant: "As between themselves, the partners
had the right to make such disposition of the partnership property
as they deemed fit. . . . The Uniform Partnership Act recognizes
this right and provides that the intention and agreement of the
parties is to control. '78
In Wright v. Smith, decided during the early years of the
UPA, the Michigan Supreme Court considered the ownership of a
checking account held in joint tenancy by the members of an al-
leged partnership. In allowing the funds to pass by survivorship,
the court found that the alleged partnership would not defeat the
ownership of the checking account by joint tenancy. Instead, the
court held that the possibility of a partnership being imposed pro-
vided an additional reason why the owners clearly made the ac-
count a joint tenancy.
With respect to the ownership of the checking account, Wil-
liam Palmer relied upon an earlier Montana decision, Casagranda
v. Donahue.80 That case involved a bank account with a joint ten-
ancy signature card. The joint tenancy ownership was not ques-
tioned until after the death of one of the joint tenants. In the
Casagranda opinion the Montana Supreme Court stated,
"[i]ntention is clearly expressed on the face of the signature card.
Additional evidence is unnecessary. ' ' 81 Since deciding Casagranda,
the Montana Supreme Court has stated that a signature card is
not conclusive evidence of a joint tenancy.82 However, the general
rule remains that the signature card establishes ownership when
another intent is not shown. 3
76. Palmer, __ Mont. at -, 708 P.2d at 252 (Morrison, J., dissenting).
77. 117 Vt. 13, 84 A.2d 408 (1951).
78. Id. at 16, 84 A.2d 410.
79. 235 Mich. 509, 209 N.W. 576 (1926).
80. 178 Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286 (1978).
81. Id. at 484, 585 P.2d at 1288.
82. See, e.g., Anderson v. Baker, 196 Mont. 494, 500, 641 P.2d 1035, 1038 (1982).
83. See, e.g., Malek v. Patten, - Mont. , -, 678 P.2d 201, 204 (1984).
1988]
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The Montana UPA section that allows the contrary intention
to show ownership other than by tenancy in partnership,"" when
taken together with the court's holding in Casagranda, supports
finding joint tenancy ownership of the checking account. A Mon-
tana practitioner handling a similar case could further support this
argument with cases such as Stroh and Wright. Interpreting the
Montana UPA as allowing the presumption of tenancy in partner-
ship to be overcome under a test such as in Casagranda, the court
in Palmer would have kept Montana law in conformity with that
of other jurisdictions which adopted the UPA.
D. Other Evidence of Intent
Regarding the ownership of the brands, William Palmer relied
on the Montana Supreme Court decision in Marshall v.
Minlschmidt.6 The court in Marshall held that the names of the
owners joined by the word "or" creates a joint tenancy interest in
the brand.86 As noted previously, the owners of a brand have the
same interest in the cattle branded with that brand as they have in
the brand itself.8 7 This view concerning the wording of an owner-
ship document establishing title has since been reaffirmed by the
Montana Supreme Court.8
William and Robert re-registered one brand in 1971, using
"or" in place of "and." William testified at trial that he and Robert
understood the effect of registering the brand in the way they
did.8" This act by the Palmers showed an intent to create a certain
ownership in the cattle.
In other jurisdictions this act would show a contrary intention
sufficient to consider the brand joint tenancy property. In District
of Columbia v. Riggs National Bank, the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals decided the ownership of savings accounts held
by partners as joint tenants." The court held that if partners
maintain property as joint tenants, and evidence produced shows
they understood the consequences, the court should give effect to
the right of survivorship.91
The Iowa Supreme Court in Estate of Allen dealt with the
84. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-203(2) (1987).
85. 148 Mont. 263, 419 P.2d 486 (1966).
86. Id. at 269, 419 P.2d at 489.
87. Id. at 270, 419 P.2d at 490.
88. First Westside Nat'l Bank v. Llera, 176 Mont. 481, 485, 580 P.2d 100, 103 (1987).
89. Record at 12-20, Palmer __ Mont. at -, 708 P.2d 242 (available at clerk of
court's office in Park County).
90. 335 A.2d 238 (D.C. App. 1975).
91. Id. at 244.
[Vol. 49
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question of whether property is owned by the partnership. 2 Allen
involved a farming partnership utilizing a number of parcels of
land. According to the title to those parcels of land, each partner
was a joint tenant as to his wife. The partner and his wife, as a
couple, in turn had a tenancy in common with another couple. Re-
garding this arrangement the court said: "It is manifest the parties
carefully thought out and provided for the nature of their owner-
ship in the parcels. The trial court was correct in determining the
land was not a partnership asset."93
Under the reasoning of the Iowa court, the change in the re-
corded ownership of the cattle brand in Palmer would be strong
evidence of the parties intent to hold the brand other than as a
partnership asset.
The large span of time between the opening of the bank ac-
count in 1947 and Robert's death in 1981 also seemed to be a fac-
tor in the court's decision in Palmer."4 Significant in this respect is
Brooks, Inc. v. Brooks, in which the South Dakota Supreme Court
found property used in a partnership to be partnership property
even though title was held in joint tenancy. 5 In Brooks, two broth-
ers operated a long continuing farming operation. One tract of land
purchased by the brothers had title held as joint tenants.9" The
brothers held all of the other assets involved with the partnership,
including other tracts of land as tenants in common. One brother
died. The surviving brother lived for six more years. During this
time the surviving brother continued to manage the partnership
property, and never claimed the property by right of survivorship.
Ownership of the one tract of land by joint tenancy was not discov-
ered until the partnership assets were being divided following the
death of the second brother.
At first blush, the Brooks decision appears to support the
court's implication in Palmer that time may lessen the certainty of
some methods of showing intent. However, in Palmer the partners
added William's son Brad's name to the signature card many years
after the opening of the account, and made no other changes at
that time. This change to the signature card, without changing the
form of ownership suggests reaffirmation of the intent to have a
joint tenancy.
92. 239 N.W.2d 163 (Iowa 1976).
93. Id. at 167.
94. Palmer, - Mont. at -, 708 P.2d at 248.
95. 86 S.D. 676, 201 N.W.2d 128 (1972).
96. Id. at 677, 201 N.W.2d at 129. Title was conveyed to the brothers as "joint tenants
with right of survivorship."
1988]
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E. Fraud, Mistake, and Estoppel
An example of fraud in relation to survivorship rights in part-
nership property is found in Condos v. Felder.9 7 The illiterate Fel-
der did not know the contents of documents he signed. Felder's
partner led Felder to believe that they had a joint tenancy with
right of survivorship as to the real property and inventory of their
business. But the documents Felder signed, as prepared by his
partner, created a partnership in which Felder had an interest in
the business inventory, but no interest in the real property. After
the death of his partner, Felder became aware of the true situation.
Finding that Felder had been defrauded, the court awarded him all
the assets of the partnership. The court reasoned that the assets
should have passed by survivorship, as Felder's partner had led
him to believe they would. 8
The doctrine of mistake can be used in cases factually similar
to Brooks.9 9 In Brooks the evidence suggested mutual mistake by
the partners in taking title to one tract of land as joint tenants.
Similarly, the court in Brooks could have applied the doctrine of
estoppel, due to the time that elapsed while the surviving brother
could have claimed the property but did not.
The court in Palmer also could have applied equity principles
such as fraud, mistake, or estoppel. In doing so the court could
have clearly expressed any underlying factors involved in its deci-
sion and still kept Montana partnership law in conformity with
other jurisdictions.
V. CONCLUSION
The court's analysis in Palmer of property ownership in a
partnership setting was flawed by reliance on outdated authority.
The Palmer decision creates at least two problems. First, the deci-
sion will cause uncertainty for Montana property owners utilizing
joint tenancy ownership in conjunction with a partnership arrange-
ment.100 And second, by diverging from the interpretations of other
jurisdictions, Montana's law concerning partnership property dif-
fers from that of other states, defeating a primary purpose of en-
acting uniform laws.101
By combining and synthesizing the authority presented in this
97. 92 Ariz. 366, 377 P.2d 305 (1962).
98. Id. at 372, 377 P.2d at 309 (1962).
99. See supra note 95; Brooks, 86 S.D. 676, 201 N.W. 128.
100. Palmer, __ Mont. at __, 708 P.2d at 251 (Turnage, C.J., dissenting).
101. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-104(4) (1987). UNIF. PARTNERSHIP ACT § 4(4), 6 U.L.A.
16 (1914).
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note, a workable formula can be derived for answering a question
such as in Palmer. The formula consists of a systematic series of
presumptions of differing weight derived from the combined wis-
dom found in the UPA and the case law.
Following this formula the court should first look for any
agreement between the partners. If an agreement exists that states
the assets are to be held in a particular manner, or are to pass a
certain way at the death of a partner, the agreement should be
given effect. Since a written agreement is usually the best evidence
of intent, practitioners should suggest such a written agreement to
clients in a relationship that may be declared a partnership. Under
the formula offered here, such an agreement should control, unless
extenuating circumstances exist.
The extenuating circumstances the court should look to in-
clude fraud, such as in Condos,"2 mistake or estoppel, such as in
Brooks,103 or other similar circumstances that should affect the
outcome. If there are none of these extenuating circumstances, an
agreement between the parties should control.
In the absence of an agreement by the parties, the court
should next look to the source of funds used to purchase the asset.
It is presumed that the ownership of the asset is the same as that
of the source of funds used to acquire it. Generally this source of
funds will suggest the asset is partnership property, as assets taken
out of the partnership by the partners individually would still be
viewed as partnership property under the source of funds analysis.
Therefore, record title and other evidence of intent must be al-
lowed to rebut the presumption from source of funds. But the pre-
sumption from source of funds remains important in that all assets
will have a source of funds, while other methods of establishing
intent may be absent.
The next consideration involves record title of the asset. In
this phase of the formula the court should use the same test as it
does normally in regards to the particular type of asset. For exam-
ple, regarding checking accounts it should use an analysis such as
in Casagranda,04 and with brands an analysis such as in
Minlschmidt.10 5 Under that analysis if the asset is considered joint
tenancy, there is a presumption it is joint tenancy, in the partner-
ship setting. This presumption from record title must be of greater
strength than that of source of funds, in order to give effect to the
102. 92 Ariz. 366, 377 P.2d 305.
103. 86 S.D. 676, 201 N.W.2d 128.
104. 178 Mont. 479, 585 P.2d 1286.
105. See supra note 85. 148 Mont. 263, 419 P.2d 486.
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language of the Montana UPA. °8
Next the court should consider additional evidence of intent.
This step is essentially used to strengthen or overcome the pre-
sumptions from source of funds and recorded title, especially when
they are in conflict. It is important to note the weakness usually
present in this step of the analysis. Generally this step will involve
inferences regarding intent of the deceased, while the only positive
evidence of the deceased's intent is found in the source of funds,
the recorded title, or a written agreement.
Using the authority and approach presented here, Montana
practitioners, in a case similar to Palmer, can present the Montana
Supreme Court with a systematic approach based on the UPA as
interpreted in other jurisdictions. This would help the court estab-
lish standards for evaluating the ownership of property used in
conjunction with a partnership in Montana. With clear standards
for evaluating the ownership of assets in the partnership setting
Montana practitioners would be able to provide more certain ad-
vice to their clients. Such a standard would also place Montana law
back in line with that of other jurisdictions.
106. MONT. CODE ANN. § 35-10-203(2) (1987).
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